The Risks of and Reactions to Underdeterrence in Torts by Galligan, Thomas C.
1The Risks of and Reactions to Underdeterrence in Torts 
By: Thomas C. Galligan Jr.1
As our nation considers tort reform at both the state and federal levels, it should not be 
blinded to the fact that, while tort law may, in some cases, overdeter, it also may underdeter, 
especially in mass tort cases.  The piece contends that the traditional (one-on-one) model of tort 
law may both cause and exacerbate the underdeterrence problems and, consequently, alternative 
models (class action, augmented awards, and public tort suits) must be considered and analyzed.  
The piece proceeds to compare and contrast the strengths and weaknesses of each of the various 
approaches for different types of cases.  The article builds upon earlier works on augmented 
awards and public torts, and this piece both expands upon that work and extends it.  It presents 
both a vision and a theoretical view of mass torts that is too often ignored in today’s debate about 
tort reform.
I.  Introduction
In art, the term “chiaroscuro” means the strengthening of an “illusion” of depth on a 
canvas by boldly contrasting light and dark shades of color.2  The chiaroscurist uses color and 
contrast to create the appearance of depth on the canvas.  That appearance is an illusion created 
to show the real depth in the scene portrayed.  In the debate about tort reform, the opposing 
participants use words and sharply contrasting views of the world to communicate their 
positions.  What is often left is not an illusion of depth but a seemingly irresolvable conflict.  As 
1Dean and Elvin E. Overton Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tennessee 
College of Law.  I am indebted to Jason Steinle for his outstanding research assistance and to 
Kurt Krushenski for his great technical support.
2Artlex, Art Dictionary, www.artlex.com/Artl.ex/c/chiaroscuro.html.  See also, 
wsmith@wordsmith.org, 2/7/2005.
2a result, what really may be needed is an examination of why the discussion to date has been 
more of a battle than an attempt to paint or repaint the canvas of American accident law.  One of 
the cries of the tort reformer3 is that modern tort law overdeters beneficial conduct.  The contrary 
assertion is that tort law does and has deterred much dangerous conduct resulting in a safer 
world.4  Who is right?  What is the solution?  The reality may be that tort law both over and 
underdeters in different areas for different reasons.  Underdeterrence may arise out of the fact 
that in many cases, particularly mass tort cases, the traditional model of the one-on-one tort case 
creates pressures and rules that lead to underdeterrence in a vast array of multiple injury cases.  
My goal here is to identify some of the areas in which current tort law underdeters and to discuss 
several possible solutions.  My goal in this essay is not to inflame the debate but rather to 
provide some contrast to the overdeterrence claims–a contrast necessary to portray the true depth 
of the issue.5
The idea that liability or the prospect of liability can shape human behavior through 
deterrence has become one of the practical and theoretical foundations of tort law.6  Judges and 
scholars regularly state that deterrence - the prospect that liability can influence behavior - is one 
3See, e.g., State of the Union: Bush Reiterates Support for Tort Reform, Tax Credits, 
http://bcbshealthissues.com/proactive/newsroom/release.vtml7id=144867;  Tort Reform: Needed 
or Hyped?  http://uspolitics.about.com/od/electionissues/a/tort_reform.htm.
4See, e.g., CJA - The Committee for Justice for All, http://www.saynotocaps.org/.
5Of course, the tort reformer may claim I am only showing an illusion of depth.  The 
artist might respond that the depicted depth is real but that on the canvas or page only the illusion 
of depth is possible.
6Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts, § 11 at 19 (2000) [hereinafter DOBBS].
3of the purposes of tort law.7  The legal economist recognizes that liability or the possibility of 
liability forces people to internalize accident costs; it forces them to consider the costs of the 
injuries that their activities may cause to others.  To the extent tort law does not force people to 
take account of all their activities’ accident costs, tort law inefficiently underdeters.  
Concomitantly, to the extent that tort law imposes liability in excess of an actor’s activity costs, 
tort law inefficiently overdeters.  
One of the underlying notions of much “tort reform”8 is that tort law today has produced 
liability where there should not be liability, thereby resulting in overdeterrence, over investments 
in safety, and frustrated development of life improving products and processes.  As noted, my 
goal here is not to attempt to refute the notion that tort law can, and perhaps, has overdeterred.  
Instead, I will consider the possibility that although some aspects of tort law may overdeter, there 
may well be many areas where current tort law underdeters.  That is, there may well be many 
7Id.
8Tolerance of underdeterrence for certain injury causing activities not only undermines 
optimal investments in safety, it also impacts upon the freedom of the involved individuals and it 
results in inequality.  Freedom is at stake because underdeterrence will lead to more than the 
optimal number of injury causing accidents.  These accidents infringe upon the freedom of those 
who are injured in the accidents.  No liability or no threat of liability essentially allows one 
person to limit another’s freedom at no cost.
Equality is at stake because the person engaged in the underdeterred activity has an 
advantage over the person engaged in an optimally deterred activity.  Thus the person engaged in 
an underdeterred activity does not have to take account of all their activity costs - the accident 
costs.  This means the advantaged actor has an advantage, akin to a judicially provided subsidy, 
that seems inconsistent with our society’s commitment to equality and equality of economic 
opportunity.  Contrariwise, where tort law overdeters freedom and equality are impacted because 
someone who is forced to pay more than the accident costs their activity has caused is being 
“taxed” at a rate in excess of what efficiency concerns would demand.  And, the person who 
over-recovers has a windfall, or undeserved recovery.  Of course, if a windfall results in a more 
efficient allocation of resources, the windfall might be more tolerable. 
4areas where tort law, as it exists today, does not adequately encourage efficient investments in 
safety.  Many of these areas occur in mass tort cases where more than one person is injured.  In 
some of those cases the underdeterrence is caused by the fact that all who are injured do not sue.  
But, another critical reason for underdeterrence is that rules developed for one-on-one garden 
variety tort cases do not effectively deter in multi-plaintiff or mass injury situations.
Herein, I seek to identify some of the reasons for possible underdeterrence.  I also discuss 
different models for the prosecution of tort suits:  the one-on-one model, the class action, the 
augmented award, and the public tort suit, and then apply each of these models in served 
contexts where tort law currently underdeters.  Not surprisingly, since many of the 
underdeterrence problems arise in or from the one-on-one model, the one- on-one model holds 
the least promise for achieving efficient deterrence in mass tort cases.  The class action, as a 
conglomeration or aggregation of one-on-one cases holds some limited promise for improved 
deterrence.  The augmented (or increased award) where one person recovers as a proxy for those 
who have not sued holds increased promise for achieving efficient deterrence but is somewhat 
limited by its punitive damages lineage as well as its potential windfall effect and the risk of 
overdeterrence.  The public tort suit, in which the governmental entity seeks to recover as proxy 
for the injured who do not sue has great promise as a device to achieve efficient deterrence but 
raises concerns about the proper role of government and separation of powers.  Not surprisingly, 
the different devices or models have their own individual strengths and weaknesses with 
different models preferable in different situations.
In Part II, I shall explain the deterrence problem in more detail and then describe the four 
models for prosecuting and deciding tort cases.  Then, in Part III, I will undertake to analyze 
5underdeterrence and the strengths and weaknesses of each model in reference to particular 
aspects of underdeterrence in mass tort cases.  I will analyze cases where all who are injured do 
not sue for various reasons; underdeterrence and cause-in-fact; underdeterrence and proximate or 
legal cause; and medical monitoring.  Part IV sets forth a brief conclusion.
II.  Deterrence and the Models
A.  A Simplified Theory of Deterrence
 Do tort rules efficiently deter?  Or, do some of tort rules result in situations where people 
are effectively allowed to cause or threaten injury to many without having to provide 
compensation?  If people may injure without compensating, then those injury causing (or 
threatening) agents never need to take account of those injury costs in deciding what to do, how 
to do it, and how to value or price their activities and those activities’ resulting products, 
processes or services.9  If so, then the relevant legal rules encourage rational, profit-maximizing 
agents to behave in ways which are different from how they would behave if they were forced to 
take account of all relevant costs?10  And, consequently those who face less than all the costs of 
their activities are treated too well, i.e., they are effectively subsidized.11
In deciding tort cases, courts consider a wide variety of policies or goals: morality or 
fairness, deterrence, compensation, adherence to precedent, consistency with legislative will, 
9Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Augmented Awards:  The Efficient Evolution of Punitive 




6costs of judicial administration of various rules, punishment, risk spending, and more.12  My 
focus here is on deterrence;13 it is on what Judge Guido Calabresi calls “general deterrence.”14
The notion, as alluded to above, is that effective deterrence works hand-in-hand with 
microeconomic principles of market behavior.15  When deciding what to do, how to do it, and 
how to price it, a person must face and consider accurate costs.16  If the person does not face 
accurate costs, he or she, when acting rationally, will behave in ways that are not optimal.17  He 
or she will over or under engage in the activity or will over or under price goods or services 
arising out of that activity.18  If a person faces less than accurate costs, she will over engage in 
the activity and charge too little for the results of that activity.19  If the activity creates a risk of 
injury for others that the person engaging in the activity does not have to pay (or consider), then 
12Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Deterrence:  The Legitimate Function of the Public Tort, 58 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1019, 1021 (2001) (citing William L. Crowe, Sr., The Anatomy of a Tort:  
Greenian, as Interpreted by Crowe Who Has Been Influenced by Malone:   A Primer, 22 LOY. L. 
REV. 903, 906-09 (1976))[hereinafter cited as Public Tort].
13I realize focusing on only one goal or purpose of tort law may be both unrealistic and 
potentially myopic.  However, ignoring or minimizing that goal may be equally dangerous.
14GUIDO CALABRESI, THE LAW OF ACCIDENTS 69-70 (1970), [hereinafter cited as 
CALABRESI].
15Id.
16Augmented Awards note 9, at 10, n.10 (citing CALABRESI, supra note 14, at 70).
17A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages:  An Economic Analysis, 
111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 873 (1998), [hereinafter cited as “Polinsky & Shavell”].
18Id. at 882, 885
19Id.
7we have a problem.20  More people will be hurt than should be hurt from the economist’s 
perspective.  Contrariwise, legal rules that forced actors to take account of all the costs of their 
activities would encourage efficient investments in safety.21  Put differently, those efficiency 
gauged legal rules would optimally (efficiently) deter dangerous behavior.
To the extent legal rules allow or result in “inefficient” injuries, society faces several 
serious problems.  First, the society faces a misallocation of resources.22  Second, some people 
are allowed to engage in some activities without having to face accurate costs or accurate 
marginal cost curves.23  This threatens free competition, arguably has wealth distribution effects, 
and causes unequal opportunities for and to profit.24  Third, because the underdeterred are able to 
injure others at inefficiently high levels, the underdeterred impact upon the freedom of the 
injured in a way that is not only inefficient but morally disturbing.25
20Id. at 887-89
21Id. at 889
22Id. at 889, 899-900
23Id. at 889.  Of course, if legal rules overdeter, costs for the overdeterred would be too 
high.
24Id. at 946-47
25Id. at 913-14.  As part of a free society, we have entered into a social contract, JEAN-
JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 23 (G.D.H. Cole trans., 1988) (1761), that 
expressly and impliedly articulates the rules by which we live.  Those rules appear in 
Constitutions, see generally U.S. CONST. amends. V and XIV (containing the two due process 
clauses), statutes, For instance, 28 U.S.C. § 1983 (2004) provides that any person who, under 
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other 
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit 
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . ., and regulations, see 8 C.F.R. § 264.1 (2004) 
8(outlining the necessary registration and fingerprinting procedures for resident aliens).  Key parts 
of that collection of rules are judicial decisions which either interpret Constitutions, statutes, and 
regulations or which provide gap filling rules in the absence of Constitutional provisions, 
statutes, or applicable administrative regulations.  Except as otherwise “agreed,” we are free to 
do as we choose.
Naturally an issue we face all the time is:  where does my freedom to do as I please end 
and where does another’s begin?  Some individual freedoms are so basic that we protect them 
from governmental intrusion in our Constitutions.  Some freedom boundaries are set and 
governed by criminal law.  Some boundaries are defined by non-criminal statutes.
Other freedoms are less clearly articulated.  These we often leave to the common law,
 including the law of torts.  The law of torts—civil wrongs other than breaches of contract, 
VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE, AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS 1 (2000)—is where a 
lot of “freedom” line drawing occurs.  This judicial line drawing is done after the fact in deciding 
particular controversies.  But the articulated rules in those decisions and their applications then 
become a critical part of the regulation of, or line drawing about, freedom.
Critically, from a torts perspective, my freedom to act stops when I intentionally hit you 
in the face.  I am generally not allowed to batter you, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
13 (1965).  Of more general application, my freedom to do what I please is limited by what we 
may facilely call a general duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid affirmatively doing harm to 
others, i.e., the law of negligence, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965).
My freedom to behave as I choose in the market is limited by my duty not to manufacture 
unreasonably dangerous products, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. §§ 1-2 
(1998); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), my duty not to misrepresent facts 
upon which those with whom I deal rely to their detriment, see e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 9 (1998), my duty not to make false and defamatory statements about 
others, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977), and more.  See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 10 (1998) (one may be liable for “failure to provide a 
warning after the time of sale or distribution of a product if a reasonable person in the seller's 
position would provide such a warning.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 11 
(1998) (in certain circumstances, a seller may be held liable for failure to recall a defective 
product).
Obviously, I have drastically oversimplified.  I have ignored all sorts of hard issues.  But 
the general point is that tort law is one of the legal places where we deal with the boundaries
 between people and the ultimate definition of   freedom.
To reiterate the basic point, we are a free society.  Freedom is an important value to us.  
Another important value, at least one we articulate, is equality, THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).  The value of equal treatment is made manifest in federal and 
state equal protection clauses, U.S. CONST. amend. V (the federal due process clause, which the 
courts have used to provide equal protection principles in federal cases); U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV (the state equal protection clause).  Many of the significant battles and legal battles in our 
nation’s history have dealt with equality and its meaning: The Civil War, The Suffrage 
9Consequently, to the extent tort law and the processes of deciding tort cases underdeter, 
society faces issues of grave concern.  Thus, finding areas where tort law may underdeter and 
considering how one might cure the problem merits the continued consideration of the scholar, 
as, of course, does the problem of overdeterrence.   
Movement, The Civil Rights Movement, and more.
Where does equality fit with freedom?  A part of the fit relates to the idea of equal 
opportunity.  Ideally, the broad opportunities our society promises should be equally available to 
all.  At least those opportunities should not be denied by the government, unless the government 
has a good reason to do so.  How good?  That depends upon classifications and interests involved 
and the accompanying level of scrutiny and that topic is beyond the scope of this paper, see 
generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1438-39 (2d ed. 1988).  
However, as a society we are committed to a principle of equality.
This idea of equality also fits in with our economic devotion to capitalism, although some 
in recent years have questioned whether a capitalistic society can truly be one devoted to 
equality, others still believe that equality and capitalism can coexist.  See JOHN RAWLS, A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE 265-74 (1971).  Rawls notes:  “A . . . significant advantage of a market 
system is that, given the requisite background institutions, it is consistent with equal liberties and 
fair equality of opportunity.”  Id. at 272.  Capitalism implies a free market system, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 85, 295 (7th ed. 1999).  While the end result in capitalism is not necessarily 
equality, the idea that people are encouraged to compete on a relatively even playing field is at 
its core.  In our economic system, economic agents compete for market share and profits.  Profit 
is sales price minus cost, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 560 (7th ed. 1999).  For the system to work 
cost should be accurate.  If someone does not pay all their costs, they have an advantage.  They 
can sell for less which means they should, absent other market imperfections, be able to sell 
more of the product.  Those who are allowed to pay less than real cost have what we might call a 
subsidy.  Hidden subsidies raise concerns about transparency and about open participation in 
government processes.  They result in what may appear to be unequal treatment and they may 
deprive those without the subsidy to equal opportunity to succeed in the market.
So, what does all this have to do with torts and mass torts?   It all relates to how we view 
the intersection of various agents’ voluntary acts and their regulation.  Are our rules relating to 
certain mass torts and their application consistent with notions of freedom and equality?  In 
particular, do our rules encourage a rational system whereby freedom is adequately respected and 
people are treated equally?
10
Much of the tension arises from the application of tort rules devised for one-on-one 
(bipolar) controversies,26 to situations where the interests of many are at stake, i.e., mass torts.  
The modern reality that much allegedly tortious conduct can impact many (not just one plaintiff 
and one defendant) demands a reexamination of our models of tort decision-making and what we 
are attempting to achieve.  To further the discussion, I will begin with the one-on-one model and 
move from there to the other three models: the class action, the augmented award, and the 
governmental tort suit.  The one-on-one bipolar tort suit involves one person, A, who hurts 
another person, B.  B sues A.  A and B are the only people before the court and their interests are 
the ones upon which the court focuses.27
In the most common form of class action, a group of plaintiffs come together in a suit 
against the defendant or defendants.28  What makes the suit different is the group of plaintiffs.29
They prosecute their individual claims as one group.  A representative plaintiff heads or handles 
the litigation but they head or handle it for all.30  Critically though, the class is a conglomeration 
of individual claims.31
26ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 63-66 (1995).
27Id.
28See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (2004)
29Id. 
30Somewhere between the one-on-one model and the class action is the joinder of actions.  
There, many or several individual suits are joined but no one representative plaintiff or plaintiffs 
is appointed.
31Cf.  David Rosenberg, The Caused Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A ‘Public 
Law’ Vision of the Tort System, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 849 (1984) (calling for a relaxed burden of 
proof, proportional liability, and class treatment in mass tort cases).
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In the augmented award case, about which I have written before,32 one plaintiff suing on 
his or her behalf individually also seeks to recover an increased or augmented award in order to 
achieve optimal deterrence.33  In that capacity the augmented award plaintiff sues as a proxy for 
other injured victims who are not before the court.34  Today, augmented award claims may be 
more theoretical than real.  Now, it arguably exists as part of the broader legal realm of punitive 
damages.
Finally, for present purposes, the public tort suit involves a governmental entity filing 
suit.35  The governmental suit may seek damages for particular tangible traditional injuries or the 
entity may sue to achieve deterrence.  The government sues as the peoples’ representative.36
Examples include tobacco suits, firearm suits, and lead paint suits.
III.  Underdeterrence and the Models
But, why might there be underdeterrence calling for this analysis of the different ways to 
handle tort cases?  All who are injured might not sue for various reasons.  Costs of suit, attitudes 
about justice and its accessibility, and difficulty of detection are just a few of the reasons.37
Alternatively, legal rules themselves may frustrate effective deterrence, particularly when rules 
32See Augmented Awards, supra note 9, at 40-85.
33See Augmented Awards, supra note 9, at 12-13, 49.
34Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Disaggregating More-Than-Whole Damages in Personal 
Injury Law:  Deterrence and Personal Injury Law.  71 TENN. L. REV. 117, 131 (2003) (citing 
Augmented Awards, supra note 9, at 49) [hereinafter cited as Disaggregated].
35Public Tort, supra note 12, at 1022-23.
36Id. 1027.  This action is known as a parens patriae action.
37Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 17, at 888.
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based on values or notions appropriate to the one-on-one model of tort law are applied to 
activities that injure many.38  Let me turn first to the one-on-one model of decision making in tort 
cases and focus on its nature and potential deterrence weak points.
A.  The One-on-One Model: Some More Detail
As noted, the one-on-one model involves one person who does something to another 
person that causes injury to that second person.  In this model, probably the one with which most 
of us started (and continue to start) our study of torts, both the injurer and the injured are 
individuals.  A person hits another person.39  A person runs down another with his cart or car.40
In deciding whether or not the injuring person ought to pay the injured person, we do not deal 
with the issue of insurance.  That is, there is no insurance to think about—or if there is insurance, 
we do not let the decision-maker take that fact into account.41  We treat it as irrelevant.42
Moreover, in this one-on-one case the defendant is not a corporate entity or if the defendant is a 
corporate (or other juridical) entity we ignore that fact even though the corporation has already 
38Augmented Awards, supra note 9, at 136-39 (footnotes omitted); Public Tort, supra 
note 12, at 1036-37; Rosenberg, supra note 31.
39See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965)
40See, e.g., Li. v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975).
41See also, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A(2) (1979) (“Payments made to or 
benefits conferred on the injured party from other sources are not credited against the tortfeasor's 
liability, although they cover all or a part of the harm for which the tortfeasor is liable”).  
Comment “c” to this section specifically states that this “collateral source rule” applies to 
insurance policies.  Of course, in states, such as Louisiana with direct action statutes, the fact that 
the defendant is insured is effectively made known to the jury as decision maker.  See La. R.S.  § 
22:655.
42RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (A), at cmt. c.
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received a liability limiting benefit from the state.43  Of course, the “owners” of a corporation 
have been allowed to limit their liability to the value of their investment in the enterprise.44  But, 
as noted, that fact is ignored in the first model.
In this one-on-one model, the focus is upon the injurer’s act and not some bigger social 
issue, like risk spreading, compensation, or economic efficiency.  We might say that the focus in 
the one-on-one case is deontological–on the parties and their moral relationship to one another 
and not on some other goal or end.45
Traditionally under this one-on-one model, there could be a case specific analysis of the 
defendant’s duty to the plaintiff46 and there is a case specific analysis of the defendant’s conduct 
(breach).47   The conduct or breach question asks: did the defendant behave as a reasonable 
person under the circumstances?48  This inquiry is a value based analysis49 whereby the 
43FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 1.1.1, at 4-5 (2000)
44Id. at 4.
45Kenneth W. Simons, Deontology, Negligence, Tort, and Crime, 76 B.U. L. REV. 273, 
276-77 (1996).
46Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99-101 (N.Y. 1928).  But see
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) § 
37 (Tentative Draft) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF TORTS:  PHYSICAL HARM].
47One of the first cases to use this analysis was the British case Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 
Eng. Rep. 490 (1837).
48Id.; Vaughan was the first case to develop the “reasonable man of ordinary prudence” 
standard that courts—and torts professors—have been using ever since.
49OLIVER WENDELL HOMES, THE COMMON LAW 96 (1881) (noting that the courts 
disfavor using the “cumbrous and expensive machinery” of the courts); the value, to steal a 
phrase from Holmes, is that we want to be confidant that before we transfer assets from one 
person to another in a tort case the transferor really did commit some wrong, i.e., breached some 
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particular behavior of the defendant is compared to the conduct of a hypothetical reasonable 
person under the circumstances.   Traditionally, tort law also required a case specific factual 
connection between what the defendant did and what happened to the plaintiff--cause-in-fact.50
It demanded that “but for” the defendant’s particular alleged wrong, the plaintiff would not have 
suffered the particular injuries that the plaintiff suffered.51  And, the law of torts also has required 
a case specific examination of whether the defendant ought to be held liable to the plaintiff for 
the particular injuries which occurred in the particular manner in which they occurred--proximate 
or legal cause.52  We will return to the effects of those traditional one-on-one legal rules later.
1.  A Variant of the One-on-One Model and Page of Legal History
As a variant of the first model, one, of course might add in the fact that the defendant was
insured or that it was a corporation.  But, as noted above, the one-on-one model would not allow 
that fact to change the outcome (at least we would not admit it).  The one-on-one model would 
still treat the case as individual versus individual.  The one-on-one model would apply the same 
rules as determinative of the case’s outcome— duty/breach/cause- in-fact/proximate cause, etc.  
Of course, the reasonable care explosion (revolution) of the 1950s, 60s, and 70s was 
driven by the availability of insurance and the possibility of risk spreading.53  That “reasonable 
duty.  Id.
50Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 60-61 (1956)
51David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause-in-Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1765, 
1775 (1997).  See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS: PHYSICAL HARM, § 26.
52Some have treated the proximate or legal cause problem as an issue of scope of duty.  
LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 76 (1930).
53A most useful summary of the history of Products Liability under Restatement § 402A, 
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care revolution” was a distinct trend toward abrogating immunities54 and limited duties55 in 
certain contexts and analyzing defendants’ conduct under the general reasonable care standard.56
In retrospect, it seems clear that the availability of insurance and post-World War II notions of 
risk spreading played a key role.57  The comparative fault explosion of the same period also was 
heavily influenced by insurance and risk spreading.58  Likewise, the availability of insurance and 
risk spreading through increased prices greatly impacted the development of product liability 
law.  Risk spreading through increased prices and insurance influenced courts when they shaped 
including the theories of Justice Traynor and Dean Prosser that gave birth to the reasonable care 
revolution, can be found in Jim Gash, Beyond Erin Brockovich and a Civil Action:  Should Strict 
Products Liability Be the Next Frontier for Water Contamination Lawsuits?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 
51, 85-90 (2002).
54Id.
55Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 565-68 (Cal. 1968) (outlining several instances in 
which a possessor of land has limited duties—and thus lessened liability—when a person is 
injured on his land).
56Justice Peters, writing for the majority in Rowland (Justice Traynor concurred in the 
judgment) wrote that:
A departure from this fundamental principle involves the balancing of a number of 
considerations; the major ones are the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of 
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the 
defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's 
conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant 
and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting 
liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk 
involved.
Id. at 564.
57See Fleming James, Jr., Accident Liability Reconsidered:  The Impact of Liability 
Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549, 551-56 (1948); see also Fleming James, Jr., General Products—
Should Manufacturers be Liable Without Negligence?, 24 TENN. L. REV. 923, 923-24 (1957).
58VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 1.01, at 2-3 (4th ed. 2002).
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liability rules.59  Strict product liability promised that people could be compensated and risks 
spread broadly.  
Of course, theoretically, the imposition of liability, even if influenced by the availability 
of insurance and risk spreading concerns, also had another effect.  It imposed liability upon the 
entity that caused the injury.  Thus, the cost of the accidents that the entity caused were paid by, 
or at least allocated to, the entity.  If the entity “passed” the cost on to insurers, the entity’s 
premium hopefully would, in the future, reflect the costs of the injuries it caused.  If the entity 
“passed” on its accident costs through higher priced goods, those who used the goods paid the 
price—or did not buy the good, thereby leading to more limited production.  But that was reality.  
It was a reality consistent with our notions of capitalism—pay your own way and compete—and 
equality—some economic agents ought not have special protections or liability limitations not 
available to others.  However, to the extent the availability of insurance or the possibility of risk-
spreading played a part in the development of legal rules, that role would be inconsistent with the 
pure one-on-one model.  Under the pure one-on-one model, one could persuasively argue that 
broader deterrence goals were inappropriate to the particular case before the court.60
B.  Multiple Injured Plaintiffs
59One of the most famous early formulations of the strict liability rule was issued by 
Justice Traynor in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963) 
(citations omitted):
A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing 
that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes 
injury to a human being. Recognized first in the case of unwholesome food products, 
such liability has now been extended to a variety of other products that create as great or 
greater hazards if defective.
60See generally, Ernest Weinrib, Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 50 UCLA L. Rev. 
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Today, the postmodern reality is that many actions give rise to not one injury to one 
person but rather many injuries to many people.  This factual reality may complicate things.  To 
concretize theses cases, one might think of the product liability design,61 warning, 62or 
misrepresentation case63 or the toxic tort case.64  Factually, these “cases” involve many injuries; 
however, under the traditional one-on-one tort model, these “many” cases are still treated no 
differently than the traditional tort case involving one plaintiff and one defendant.  The same sets
 of rules still would apply.  But is that realistic?  Might there be benefits or efficiencies to be 
gained by applying different rules or models?  And, are the traditional rules consistent with our 
notions of optimal deterrence?
1.  Enter the Class Action
One procedural vehicle often employed in multiple injury cases is the Rule 23(b)(3) class
 action.65  Where or how does the class action fit in?  It is a way to conglomerate individual 
claims; that’s it.  It is merely a collection of individual claims.  But for the class action to go 
621 (2002).
61See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. §§ 1-2 (b) (1998); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
62See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. §§ 1, 2 (c) (1998).
63See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 9 (1998).
64See In re “Agent Orange” Prods. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980).
65Of course, there are other types of class actions.  Indeed one recent commentator has 
argued that the limited fund class action may be the preferred and perfect way to prosecute 
damages suits in multiple injury contexts.  See, Semra Mesulam - Note ____ Collective Awards 
and Limited Punishment: Solving the Punitive Damages Dilemma With Class, 104 Columbia L. 
Rev. 1114 (2004).  However, the 23(b)(3) common questions class is perhaps the most familiar, 
relevant, and common.
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forward under the traditional model the similarities between the cases must be such that the cases 
can be joined as a class.66  Common issues of fact and law must predominate and the class action 
must be a superior device for resolution of the dispute.67  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(b)(3) provides that “questions of law and fact common to members of the class must 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.”68  Where those common 
issues are not predominant, the 23(b)(3) class is inappropriate and the cases go forward as 
individual cases under the traditional model.69  In what contexts might the Rule 23(b)(3) class 
action be preferable to a series of one versus one suits?70  One is where all who are injured might 
not otherwise sue (on their own in one-on-one suits).
2.  All Who Are Injured Do Not Sue
Why might all those who are hurt not sue?71  One reason might be because the costs of 
66FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)-(b) (2004).
67Id.
68FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (2004).
69Of course, even if there is no class there may be consolidated cases where the boarders 
between individual cases, class actions, and joined claims blur.
70Of course, the class may produce procedural efficiencies if resolution of all claims in a 
class was less expensive than resolution of all those claims through a series of one versus one 
suits.  The existence of class resolution savings would seem to be empirical and may depend 
upon the particular suit or suits.  Herein, I assume there are no procedural efficiencies.  This is a 
critical simplifying assumption.
71Of course, if all injured sue and seek to recover more than once for the same injury,  
there would be a serious overdeterrence problem.  Likewise, proposed federal legislation making 
it easier to file class actions in federal court or remove class actions to federal court may have 
huge practical effects but do not impact upon the substantive aspects of what is said here.  See § 
5, Class Action Fairness Act of 2005.
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suit vis-a-vis the injuries suffered are so high that it is not worth it for all individuals to bring a 
suit.72  Alternatively, and quite simply, some people may prefer to do things other than sue.  
a.  The One-on-One Model: When All Injured Do Not Sue
Under the traditional one-on-one model, if all who are injured do not sue (or otherwise 
prosecute their claims), defendants face less than full liability.  Defendants face less than all of 
the costs of their activities and they therefore would face a marginal cost curve that is lower than 
it ought to be; their goods or products consequently would cost less than they should cost and 
people will over consume the good or product because it costs less than it should.  To restate, 
producers and consumers would not be paying all the costs of production.  They would be 
getting an advantage.  One might even say they were effectively receiving a subsidy.
b.  The Class Action When All Do Not Sue
Would the class action solve this problem?  In certain cases, the answer is undoubtedly 
yes.  If all individuals affected are entitled to recover under traditional (one-on-one) tort rules but 
simply do not sue, the class action would work to achieve optional deterrence if there is 
sufficient commonality73 between the claims.  The class would allow all claims to be prosecuted.  
The class would provide a mechanism to conglomerate or collect (aggregate)74 all the claims in 
one suit and achieve efficient deterrence, assuming that the transaction costs associated with the 
72See Disaggregating, supra note 34 at 131 (citing Public Tort, supra note 12 at 1033).
73Relaxing the commonality rule might allow joinder where to do so would lead to 
greater, i.e., more efficient, deterrence.  But would that do violence to the traditional model?  At 
some level the answer is yes because the focus would be on the common issues rather than on the 
uncommon, individual to individual, differences. 
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class do not exceed the value of the injuries caused.  That is, assume A causes $1,000 worth of 
damage to 100 people.  If there is no liability (or no potential) liability A could ignore $100,000 
in injury costs that it has imposed on others.  Alternatively, if for personal reasons, only 40 
injured people sued in one versus one (A) suits and recovered ($40,000 in recoveries) then A 
could effectively ignore $60,000 (60 unfiled claims) in costs.  However, if the 60 unfiled claims 
could proceed as a class (or part of a class) then liability (of $60,000) would result in efficient 
deterrence ($40,000 + $60,000 = $100,000).  
Of course, life may not be so simple.  For instance, assume that the costs of proceeding as 
a class in any hypothetical case, exceeded net recoveries or benefits so that plaintiffs or their 
lawyers would not proceed.  Then, there would be no liability and A would face less than the 
total costs in decision-making.  Put numerically, if the cost of notifying all class members and 
keeping them informed was $61,000; then, suit would not proceed and efficient deterrence would 
not be obtained.75
c.  The Augmented Award
Are there alternative legal devices to the one-on-one suit and the class action that might 
lead to efficient deterrence when everyone does not file suit and the 23(b)(3) class action does 
not adequately promise to force optimal cost internalization?  There are.  As I have previously 
74See generally, Lawrence Solon, Procedural Justice, 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 181 (2004).
75As one insightful recent commentator has noted class actions may have another benefit.  
When a defendant’s action harms many, the defendant enjoys a comparative advantage over 
individual plaintiffs because it (the defendant) can spread the costs of litigation over the universe 
of cases.  The individual plaintiff cannot.  Conglomerating claims in a class action may offset 
some of this litigation investment assymetry.  Note, Locating Investment Asymmetries and 
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written, one could allow those who do file suit to recover augmented awards or what Professor 
Sharkey aptly calls social compensatory damages76 equal in amount to the value of the claims 
not filed.  This is the augmented awards approach.77  The strength of this approach is that it leads 
to efficient deterrence and that it avoids the transaction costs inherent in class certification, 
communications, and distributions.  For instance, if 60 of the 100 persons injured in the above 
hypothetical do not sue, a class action might (depending upon transaction costs) achieve efficient 
deterrence by conglomerating individual claims but so could an augmented award suit.  In that 
suit, one person would recover the damages suffered by the 60.  But, what does the augmented 
awards suit add?
As noted, it may add the possibility of efficient deterrence when the class action would 
not provide it.  That is, in the situation hypothesized above, the class action involved excessive 
process associated transaction costs ($61,000).  The augmented award suit might strip some of 
those class action associated transaction costs and might provide a more cost effective (cheaper) 
way to achieve efficient deterrence.  If the transaction costs of prosecuting the augmented awards 
suit are less than $60,000 it should lead to optimal deterrence where the class action would not.
Not surprisingly, there are several potential down sides to augmented awards suits.  First, 
Optimal Deterrence in the Mass Tort Claim, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2665 (2004).
76Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347,
389-90 (2003), [hereinafter cited as “Sharkey.”].
77Arguably, a limited fund class action seeking punitive damages, see Semra Mesulam -
Note, Collective Awards and Limited Punishment: Solving the Punitive Damages Dilemma With 
Class, 104 Columbia L. Rev. 1114 (2004), may be viewed as a type of augmented awards suit 
where the punitives are sought in order to achieve deterrence as opposed to punishment or 
retribution.
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they may result in a windfall to the plaintiff.78  That windfall may be neither here nor there for 
purposes of deterrence but it may offend other notions about just rewards,79 the desirability of 
rent seeking behavior in lawsuits,80 and the lottery effect of judicial proceedings.  Moreover, the 
60 hypothetical victims who did not sue but whose damages were awarded to (“recovered by?”) 
the augmented awards plaintiff are not compensated for their loss.   If those 60 victims have 
simply decided not to sue because on some level it is not worth it to them, so be it.  But, what if 
their decision has led to dependence upon public programs or private largesse?  Should it bother 
us that our augment awards plaintiff has recovered the victim’s loss and others are “supporting” 
the victim(s)?  Professor Sharkey’s proposals regarding what she calls social compensatory 
damages solve some of these problems in that she argues for the viability of a back end class 
action to provide compensation.81  One obvious area of inquiry here is the transaction costs of 
the back end class action device designed to achieve some compensation (windfall avoiding) 
effect.
Another arguable problem with augmented awards relates to the traditional requirements 
for recovery of punitive damages.  Recall, as I said earlier, that today the deterrence aspect of the 
augmented awards suit may be falling under the doctrinal umbrella of punitive damages.  
Usually, in punitive damages cases, the law requires the plaintiff to establish that the defendant 
78See Augmented Awards, supra note 19, at 58 (footnotes omitted).
79Id; see also DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES:  DAMAGES—EQUITY—RESTITUTION
§§ 3.9, 4.1 (2d ed. 1993).
80Id. at 73 (footnotes omitted).
81See Sharkey, supra note 76 at 409, 409 n. 224.
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acted willfully, recklessly, or wantonly.82  That standard arguably is too high if what we are 
worried about is the plaintiff recovering sufficient amounts to lead to efficient deterrence.83
Here, the deterrence problem arises from the fact that many plaintiffs choose not to file suit.  The 
problem is not with the particularly egregious behavior of the defendant.84  Normal standards of 
behavior might be applicable—negligence, strict liability, etc.  Relatedly, in some states a 
plaintiff must establish his or her right to recover punitive damages by more than a 
preponderance of the evidence.85  Objections may be made to this heightened burden of proof in 
the efficient deterrence context.86  One obvious solution, as I have argued before,87 would be to 
disaggregate the punitive or punishment aspect of an increased award from the deterrence-based 
aspect of the award.  As noted, I call the deterrence-based award the augmented awards.  As 
82See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 381, at 1064 (2000).
83See Public Tort, supra note ____, at 63-64, stating:  
This focus on the evil defendant is consistent with the punishment rationale for punitive 
damages; however, it is not consistent with the deterrence justification for augmented 
awards. Augmented awards are not intended to punish but to deter . . . in augmented 
damages cases the court should not focus on the reprehensibility of the defendant's 
conduct, but on whether compensatory damages are too low.
84Id.
85JOHN J. KIRCHER & CHRISTINE M. WISEMAN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES:  LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 21.14 (2d ed. 2000) (citing Alaska, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Montana, South Carolina, 
Alabama, Oregon, Kentucky, Ohio, Minnesota, California, Nevada, North Dakota, Iowa, Kansas, 
Utah, and Oklahoma as states requiring clear and convincing evidence for punitive damages; in 
Colorado, the burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt).
86See Disaggregating, supra note 34, at 150-151 (footnotes omitted).
87Id. at 128; see also Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 245-46 (2d Cir. 2000)
(Calabresi, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
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noted, Professor Sharkey calls these increased awards social compensatory damages.88
Augmented awards or social compensatory damages conceivably could lead to more efficient 
deterrence and, consequently, fairer treatment for both defendants and plaintiffs.  Defendants 
would be forced to take account of all the costs of their activities.  And, plaintiffs would not have 
their freedom to act and their lives unduly impacted by a rational, profit-maximizing defendant 
who was allowed to injure the plaintiff without financial concern for the injury thanks to a tort 
law created externality.89  Moreover, the augmented award has procedural cost saving 
possibilities vis-a-vis the class action that might make it preferable in certain cases.  There is no 
certification, notice, or other costly procedural requirements associated with the augmented 
awards suit but which are involved in the class action.
Of course, the augmented award suit is a much different looking beast than the traditional 
tort suit with which we began our discussion.  As such, it may threaten traditional values and its 
development might be predictably slow.  Another concern is avoiding overdeterrence.90  Above I 
posed a hypothetical that assumed that 60 (of 100) injured people would not file suit and then 
showed how the augmented award might be a way to achieve optional deterrence.  However, if 
88See Sharkey, supra note 76,at 389-90.
89Externalities have been defined as “accident costs that the manufacturer does not take 
into account in its pricing calculus . . . These accident cost externalities allow the manufacturer 
to charge less than it should, thus selling and producing more than it should.”  Thomas C. 
Galligan, Jr., The Louisiana Products Liability Act:  Making Sense of it All, 49 LA. L. REV. 629, 
642 (1989) (footnotes omitted); for an additional discussion of externalities, see Steven Shavell, 
Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 68-94 (1980).
90For a discussion of overdeterrence and its implications in tort law, see RICHARD A. 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 214-19, 220-24 (5th ed. 1998); see also, Augmented 
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after the augmented award plaintiff recovers the $60,000, fifteen plaintiffs, whom we had 
assumed would not sue, file suit and recover $1,000 each, we have then imposed $115,000 in 
liability on A for causing $100,000 in losses.91  That $115,000 would inefficiently overdeter A.  
Liability of $115,000 would force A to pay $15,000 more in damages than the value of the 
injuries that it actually caused.  Consequently, when considering augmented awards, one must be 
vigilant to avoid overdeterrence.  One route to avoiding overdeterrence would be to hold the 
augmented award suit in abeyance until the statute of limitations has run on individual claims or 
to hold the recovery in escrow until the statute had run.  Of course, this becomes a problematic 
solution with the possibility of tolling of the statute pursuant to the “discovery” doctrine.92  This 
problem could be severe in the context of the long latency disease claim.
d.  The Public Tort Suit
Another device whereby efficient deterrence could be achieved in multiple victim cases 
where all who are injured do not sue is the public tort suit.93  Here, as noted, a governmental 
Awards, supra note 19, at 42-43, 53-58.
91$40,000 to those who sued and recovered; $60,000 to the augmented awards plaintiff; 
and $15,000 to the later filing plaintiffs.
92Dobbs notes that a statute of limitations will not begin to run until:
(a) all the elements of the tort are present and
(b) the plaintiff discovers, or as a reasonable person should have discovered,
(I) that she is injured and
(ii) that the defendant, or the defendant’s product or instrumentality, had a 
causal role in the injury, or that there was enough chance that defendant 
was connected with the injury to require further investigation that in turn 
would have revealed the defendant’s connection
DOBBS, supra note 6, at §218.
93See Public Tort, supra note 12, at 1022-23.
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entity files suit to recover otherwise unsought or unrecovered damages as surrogate plaintiff.94
The public tort suit avoids the individual windfall problem associated with augmented awards.  It 
also avoids standard of care and standard of proof problems inherent in current punitive damages 
cases.  But the governmental tort suit may be subject to the broader objection that the 
government should not be allowed to recover as surrogate and should not be able to recover 
absent some legislative action.95  That is, defendants might object to what they perceive as 
taxation by lawsuit.  I have talked about and written about these objections elsewhere and  I do 
not think the objections are sufficient to justify denying these claims across the board.96
However, at the same time I do believe that injured individuals ought to be compensated first, 
where injured individuals can be identified at reasonable cost and where the costs of distribution 
do not exceed the benefits to be gained from the distribution.  Returning to the basic question, 
why allow the public tort suit at all?  To deny the government the ability to sue absent specific 
authorization is to allow the subsidy absent authorization.  Why is the suit worse than the 
subsidy?  However, as with the augmented awards suit, the vehicle is new (at least in this 
context) and threatens tradition.
Here it may be profitable to digress for a moment to say a word about some of the recent 
high profile government or public tort suits.97  Of course, the state tobacco settlements were 
94Id. 
95Id. at 1050 (footnotes omitted).
96Id. (footnote omitted) (“The separation of powers doctrine does not seem to require 
legislative authorization for the public tort suit.”).
97See generally, David G. Owen, Products Liability Law, 657-71 (2005).  See also,
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examples of public tort suits,98 as is the federal suit against tobacco.99  Other publicized public 
tort suits include lead paint abatement suits.100  And, so are the municipal suits against firearm 
manufacturers.101
The firearm suits allege various causes of action arising out of the distribution and sale of 
guns used in illegal criminal activity.  The claims range from negligence to public nuisance.  In 
those suits the governmental plaintiffs seek to recover costs allegedly incurred as a result of 
firearm related crime.  Some of the suits survived motions to dismiss.102  Others did not.103
Some of the courts which refused to allow claims to go forward relied upon the notion that other 
branches of government were more appropriately conceived, formed and staffed to regulate 
Timothy D. Lytton, Should Government be Allowed to Recover the Costs of Public Services 
from Tortfeasors?  Tort Subsidies, the Limits of Loss Spreading, and the Free Public Services 
Doctrine, 76 Tulane L. Rev. 727 (2002).
98Seth M. Wood - Note, The Master Settlement Agreement as Class Action: An 
Evaluative Framework for Settlements of Publicly Initiated Litigation, 89 Va. L. Rev. 597 
(2003).
99The National Law Journal, 9/20/04, Pg. 10.
100See, e.g., Milwaukee v. N L Industries, ____ N. E. 2d ____ (Wis. App. 2004) 
(allowing claim to go forward).  But see City of Chicago v. American Cyanamid Co., 2003 WL 
23315567 ____ N. E. 2d ____ (Ill. App. 2005).  
101See, Public Tort, supra, note 12.
102See, e.g., City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E. 2d 1222 (Ind. 2003); James 
v. Arms Technology, Inc., 820 A. 2d 27 (N.J. Super. 2003); City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. 
Corp., 768 N.E. 2d 1136 (Ohio 2002).
103See, e.g., Camden County Board of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 273 
F. 3d 536 (3d Cir. 2001); City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., ____ N.E. 2d ____ (Ill. 2004); 
The People of the State of New York, by Elliot Spitzer, as Attorney General v. Sturm, Ruger & 
Co., Inc., 309 A.D. 2d 91 (A.D. N.Y. 2003).
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behavior, such as the distribution and sale of firearms.104  This is a separation of powers 
argument.  One wonders how separation of powers arguments “cut” when one of the supposedly 
more appropriate branches seeks redress in court.  Be that as it may, courts which have dismissed 
the public tort firearms suits105 and municipal claims in other cases106 rely upon the notion that 
the governments injury is too remote from the defendant’s act.  Legally, this notion of 
remoteness might be restated to say either the defendant had no duty to protect the governmental 
plaintiffs from their loss or that the defendant’s act was not the proximate or legal cause of the 
plaintiff’s economic loss.  One might shift the descriptive prism slightly and say that the time 
and space between the distribution or initial sale and the government’s injury cuts off any 
potential manufacturer liability.  Or, one might say that the misconduct of the actor using the 
firearm, cuts off any potential liability.  One might object that the last two sentences ignore the 
reality that criminal misuse of firearms is foreseeable.  However, foreseeability can be offset if 
the foreseeable risk is deemed remote on some moral or policy level.  One deterrence based 
policy argument made to support findings of remoteness (ergo no liability) in the municipal 
firearms cases is that the municipalities’ claims are derivative.  That is, the governmental entity’s 
claim derives from the injuries that the physical victim of gun violence suffers.107  As one court 
has put it “[t]hose immediately and directly injured by gun violence–such as gunshot wound 
104Spitzer, 309 A. 2d at 105 -06.
105See cases cited in note ____, supra.
106See, e.g., County of Cook v. Phillip Morris, Inc., ____ N.E. 2d ____ (2004) (municipal 
tobacco case).
107City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F. 3d 415, 424-25 (3d Cir. 2002).
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victims–are more appropriate plaintiffs than the City or organizational plaintiffs whose injuries 
are more indirect.”108  And, naturally, if those direct victims sue and recover, they will be 
compensated for their loss.  In that regard the deterrence and compensation goals of tort law are 
served.  But, what if the “direct” victim does not sue?  Is it better to allow the defendant to avoid 
liability with a consequent loss of optimal deterrence, or is it better to allow the less direct 
plaintiff to recover.109  This deterrence loss may be caused by direct plaintiffs not suing or by 
legal rules that deny recovery.  The legal rules problem is discussed below.  Put differently, the 
better plaintiff aspect of the remoteness argument seems to say if there is a better plaintiff who 
can sue, will sue, and can recover (under current legal rules) he or she is a better, more 
interested, more compelling plaintiff.  It does not say, if there is no such plaintiff, the 
municipality may not recover because of the possibility such a better plaintiff might have 
existed.
If the governmental tort suit might be an effective deterrence device, why allow the 
augmented awards suit?  The simple answer may be politics.  There may be reasons extraneous 
to the merits of the case(s) that lead to a governmental decision not to sue.  If the decision not to 
sue precluded private action in the form of the augmented awards suit, there would be a 
deterrence loss.  Thus, where the government did not act, the augmented award (private attorney 
general) suit potentially is an attractive and desirable option for purposes of achieving optimal 
108Id. at 425.
109Of course, there may be other reasons to deny recovery.  If the less direct victim’s 
claim is at best only a guess at what the loss is, one would be concerned with basic fairness and 
overdeterrence.  See id.
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deterrence.
Alternatively, there may be cases where even if the governmental entity was willing to 
file suit, it would face costs of mobilizing litigation (transaction costs) that were greater than the 
augmented awards plaintiff.  In that case the augmented awards device could be a more efficient 
vehicle to achieve optimal deterrence.
e.  Limited Access to Justice Under the Models
Up to now, I have assumed that the reason all who are injured do not sue is because they 
have decided filing suit individually is simply not worth their while.  Alternatively, as Judge 
Calabresi pointed out in his concurring opinion in Ciraolo v. City of New York,110 people may not 
sue because they are unaccustomed to or uncomfortable with legal institutions.111  Put 
differently, some or even many plaintiffs may have limited access to justice.  Depending upon 
the circumstances, class actions, augmented awards, or public tort suits might provide efficient 
deterrence in this limited access to justice context.  But there also may be problems.  Notably, the 
public tort suit might not work for several reasons.  First, the governmental entity may be the 
tortfeasor.  Second, the injured group may be politically weak and unable to mobilize 
governmental decision makers.112  Thus as, a practical result, the class action or augmented 
110Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 243-50 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J., 
concurring) (footnotes omitted).
111Id. at 244 (Judge Calabresi noted: “Victims will differ greatly in their knowledge of 
and access to the legal process, and those who are relatively poor and unsophisticated, as a 




awards claim may be preferable and more effective.  Of course all that is said above regarding 
the transaction costs associated with class actions is true here as well.  
3.  Difficulty of Detection and the Models
Now, building on Polinsky and Shavell’s groundbreaking work let us assume that the 
reason why all do not sue is difficulty of detection.  That is, the problem is that it is difficult for 
plaintiffs to detect the wrongdoer’s identity or the wrongdoer’s connection to the injury.  In that 
case the wrongdoer can expect to escape liability in many cases of injury causing conduct.  Here, 
the class action might be problematic.  If detection in individual suits is an issue, how does 
conglomerating those suits solve the problem?  If individuals cannot prove their claims, how 
does the class, i.e. aggregation of unprovable claims help?  It still seems that linking the 
defendant to individual plaintiffs class members might frustrate efficient deterrence.  
Alternatively, at the end of the class action, there may be substantial undistributed funds.  In 
reality then the class action becomes, in part, a collection/deterrence device rather than a 
precisely tailored way to achieve individual compensation.  As a collection device, the case may 
look more like an augmented award case.  And in difficulty of detection cases, augmented 
awards could lead to optimal deterrence as Professors Polinsky and Shavell have pointed out.113
Additionally, a governmental tort suit also might provide an efficient device for achieving 
deterrence in the difficulty of detection content. 
C.  Tort Rules and Underdeterrence
Now, let us switch gears and assume that all those who are injured will file suit. 
113See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 17, at 887-96 (see especially 894 n.66, where 
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However, traditional tort rules may still frustrate deterrence114 because tort rules created in and 
for the one-on-one model may themselves result in underdeterrence115 when applied to multiple 
injury cases.  
1.  Cause -In-Fact and Underdeterrence
One major underdeterrence problem relates to the application of traditional cause-in-fact 
requirements.  Assume that the injurer exposed the injured to some substance and that exposure 
increased the chances that those exposed would develop some adverse health consequence.  
However let us also assume that there are background risks of developing that same adverse 
health consequence.  That is, assume that 100 plaintiffs have the disease (or injury) and all filed 
suit.  Further assume that there is a 50% chance each one of those 100 sick (or injured) people 
developed the adverse health consequence because of the background risks and that there is a 
50% chance each developed the condition or disease because of the exposure.
Under the traditional one-on-one model not one of the plaintiffs will recover from the 
defendant because none of them will be able to establish that the defendant caused them to 
develop the condition.  They will all lose.  The plaintiffs cannot prove cause-in-fact under the 
traditional approach.  They cannot prove by a preponderance of the evidence that but-for the 
Polinsky and Shavell comment on the connection between damages and the probability of suit).
114See Augmented Awards, supra note 9, at 29-30 (footnote omitted).
115See Disaggregating, supra note 34, at 139 (noting that such rules as cause-in-fact, 
proximate cause, and contributory negligence may result in underdeterrence when multiple 
plaintiffs file suit); see also Public Tort, supra note 22, at 1036-37.
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defendant’s conduct they would not have suffered the disease or condition.116  Making the claim 
a class action does not help.  The class cannot prove cause-in-fact because individual members of 
the class cannot prove cause-in-fact.  Of course, this result is logical because the class is only a 
conglomeration of individual claims.  
Moreover, augmented awards for those who are successful in order to make up for 
shortfalls in recovery will not work because, under traditional cause-in-fact standards, no one 
plaintiff will be successful.  Thus, there is no one whose recovery can be augmented.  The 
governmental public suit might pose some potential for fixing the deterrence deficit.  This is 
because the suit might result in a governmental entity recovering 50% of the total “condition” 
costs for our population of 100 from the defendant.  After all we know the defendant caused 50% 
of the total “dismissed condition” costs; we just don’t know which individuals have the condition 
because of the tortfeasor.
Another way to reach the same result would be to change the rules regarding causation or 
duty.  That is, if we said that each person exposed could recover for the possibility that the 
defendant caused their injury, each might recover 50% of their total damages.  There is a 
116In certain cases, courts have relaxed the “but for” test for cause-in-fact and allowed 
recovery where the defendant’s conduct was a “substantial factor” in causing the plaintiff’s 
injuries.  The paradigmatic case, as described in Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry., 
146 Minn. 430, 179 N. W. 45 (1920), involved two fires (causes) either of which alone would 
have caused plaintiff’s injuries.  Here, if either cause alone would have caused the injury the 
“substantial factor” test might apply.  However, if either alone would not have caused the injury, 
the “substantial factor” test becomes more problematic.  For instance, if some unidentifiable 
portion of the diseased population (for reasons that are medically unknown today) are resistant to 
the toxin but not the background risk, then either cause alone would not have caused the injury.  
Despite these potential problems, several courts have applied the “substantial factor” test in toxic 
exposure cases.  See, e.g., In Re Manguno, 961 F. 2d 533 (5th Cir. 1992).
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resemblance here to the lost chance of survival theory of recovery in medical malpractice 
cases.117  If the underlying law were to change then individual suits, if everyone sued, would 
achieve efficient deterrence and cost internalization.  If the law changed, class actions also would 
be effective, with potential administrative efficiencies if the cost of prosecuting one class action 
was less than the cost of prosecuting all the individual claims.  An augmented award to one 
representing otherwise unrecovered losses would be effective if all did not sue and the risks of 
overdeterrence could be avoided.  Recovery would have to be limited to the value of otherwise 
unrecovered condition costs.  Finally, the state suit still would be efficient; however, 
overdeterrence would remain a concern.
Recall the important point that absent a change in the law, only the public tort suit 
provides the possibility of dealing with the potential deterrence lost from not allowing recovery 
in individual cases.  The one-on-one model, augmented awards, and class actions provide no 
help.
What about a case where we know that plaintiff’s condition was caused by exposure to a 
particular product; that is, what about the case where there is a signature condition or disease and 
no background risk problem?  All four models could work to provide optimal deterrence.  For 
the individual suits to achieve efficient deterrence all plaintiffs must sue.  The class action 
(including all class members) would be efficient and so would an augmented award or public tort 
117See Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts 
Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1364-70 (1981) 
(explaining the “loss of a chance of complete loss avoidance” doctrine); see also, Joseph H. 
King, Jr., “Reduction of Likelihood” Reformulation and Other Retrofitting of the Loss-of-a-
Chance Doctrine, 28 U. Mem. L. Rev. 491, 508-09 (1998) (an abbreviated explanation of the 
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suit, assuming there is no overdeterrence.  Now, let us add a complicating factor.  Suppose that 
while the plaintiff knows a particular product caused her particular condition, she cannot say 
which of several identical products that she used caused that condition.  This is the DES 
problem.118  Many manufacturers made exactly or substantially similar products that caused 
injuries to many people but the injured often could not identify which particular manufacturers 
caused their injuries.119  When identification is possible the case becomes a one-on-one product 
liability case with no significant cause-in-fact issues.  When identification is impossible the 
traditional one-on-one model is strained.
The solution that some courts adopted in the absence of identification was “market share” 
liability.  Under one form of market share liability, the defendant was liable to the individual 
plaintiff for a portion of the individual plaintiff’s damages, proportional to the defendant’s share 
of the market.  I have radically oversimplified the theory.  Under some variants of the theory 
there were complex shifting burdens of proof.120  Under others,121 a defendant was not liable if it 
doctrine).
118The two most famous DES cases are Hymovitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 
(N.Y. 1989), and Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
119Hymovitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1072; Sindell, 607 P.2d at 925-26.
120See Martin v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 689 P.2d 368, 375 (1984).  There, the court said:  
“in cases where all defendants are equally culpable, and their negligence precludes an innocent 
plaintiff from identifying them, basic considerations of fairness demand that the burden of proof 
shift from plaintiff to defendant. Defendants unable to meet the burden of proof are found jointly 
and severally liable.
121See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937 (“Each defendant will be held liable for the proportion of 
the judgment represented by its share of that market unless it demonstrates that it could not have 
made the product which caused plaintiff's injuries,” in which case the defendant would escape 
liability); see also, Bowe v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 608 N.E.2d 223, 225 n.1 (Ill. Ct. App. 1992); 
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proved that it definitely did not produce the particular DES that the plaintiff or her mother 
ingested.122
The market share theory represented a change in traditional legal rules about 
responsibility and causation.  It is different from the traditional rules because it changed one of 
the core rules we used to depend upon to supposedly keep us honest:  cause-in-fact.  Market 
share also was different because while there might  only be one plaintiff in a particular suit, there 
were multiple possible responsible defendants who might have been liable.  In most states 
application of a market share theory of causation or liability depended upon the plaintiff joining 
a substantial share of the market as defendants.  
However, nothing about market share necessarily effected the numbers on the plaintiff’s 
side of the “v.”  That is, market share effectively functioned as a theory of recovery whether 
there was one plaintiff or many.  It does seem however that the theory is more persuasive when 
there is a class or group of plaintiffs.  I say this because with a group of plaintiffs the likelihood 
that the payments being made by the various defendants in proportion to their market shares 
actually may approach an accurate reflection of their responsibility.  When only one plaintiff 
sued it seems like sticking needles in proportional haystacks but when groups sued the chances 
of coming up with something close to the right answer for the group would appear to be higher.  
But a huge problem with the class vehicle in DES-type cases is that there may be no 
Black v. Abex Co., 603 N.W.2d 182, 190 (N.D. 1999).
122One might view this “proof out” as a sort of shift of the burden of proof to the 
defendant to prove that under a one-on-one model it could not be liable.
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commonality in reference to the injuries suffered by the individual plaintiffs.123  So, a class for 
liability purposes but not quantum may be a sound solution.  Of course, there is still a huge 
administrative cost associated with the individual damage trials.
The augmented awards vehicle is another possibility in DES–type cases.  That is, one 
plaintiff could recover the damages for all but overdeterrence would have to be avoided.  As per 
the earlier discussion, the public tort suit also holds promise but it still tends to upset a lot of 
folks, i.e., government should not be doing that.124
2.  Proximate or Legal Cause and Underdeterrence
Let us now move on to proximate cause.  The traditional one-on-one case requires a close 
legal (or proximate) or policy (or fairness) connection between the defendant’s conduct and the 
123See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (2004) (requiring that there be “questions of law and fact 
common to the class” and that the “claims of defenses of the representative parties” be “typical 
of the claims or defenses of the class.”).
124One last cautionary word on cause-in-fact although I am sure there is much more to 
say.  I have made it sound like the plaintiff’s or plaintiffs’ lawyers always like a “relaxed” rule as 
to cause-in-fact.  I have made it sound like “but for” is always the friend of the defendant, not the 
plaintiff, but that is not always so.  In one case, Perkins v. Entergy 782 So.2d 606 (La 2001)., the 
Louisiana Supreme Court was faced with a complex case involving power outages, negligent 
maintenance of electric utilities and connections, death, and personal injury.  The plaintiffs had 
gotten a judgment relying, in part, on the “but for” test for cause-in-fact.  The lawyers had used a 
chain of proof relating various events to the death and underlying negligence through a series of 
but fors.  On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed, and the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate 
court, stating that in complex cases where there are multiple causes of injury the decision maker 
should employ the “substantial factor” test.  Under the traditional “substantial factor” test for 
cause-in-fact a plaintiff who could not establish cause-in-fact under the “but for” test still might 
prevail if he or she proved defendant’s fault was a substantial factor in bringing about the 
plaintiff’s injuries. The Perkins analysis turns what was a plaintiff friendly test (substantial 
factor) on its head because under its analysis what satisfies the “but for” test (it wouldn’t have 
happened if this hadn’t happened first) still might not satisfy some decision maker’s notion of 
what constitutes a substantial factor.
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plaintiff’s injuries.  The most famous articulation of this required connection probably is Judge 
Cardozo’s majority opinion in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad.125  There, the court required a 
foreseeable plaintiff which necessarily meant that the risk that arose had to be foreseeable as 
well, because, as Cardozo said:  “risk imports relation… .”126  Of course, Judge Cardozo actually 
decided the case as a matter of no duty but that was simply judicial sleight of hand.  The point is 
that whether you say no duty as Cardozo did or you say no legal or proximate cause as so many 
others do, the traditional rule is that you need that close connection in the particular case.  The 
difference of course is who decides?  Judge (duty) or Jury (proximate or legal cause).
While “who” decides is not critical to the current discussion, the inherent tension between 
different methods of articulating, if not analyzing, the “connection” requirement is at the core of 
the current discussion.  The crux of many risk/causation cases is how broadly or narrowly one 
articulates the issue.  Does one focus on the particular facts of the particular case before the 
particular court—very one-on-one?  Or, does one step back and focus on the broader issue?  
In articulating the question, lawyers do battle.  Of course they also fight about law.  In 
some cases the law battle is real: Is there a duty to protect against negligently inflicting 
emotional distress?127  Is there a duty to provide medical monitoring?128  But in many cases, the 
125162 N.E. 99, 99-101 (N.Y. 1928)
126Id. at 100 (“The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk
imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of apprehension.”).
127See DOBBS, supra note 4, § 312.  Generally, the duty to protect against negligently 
inflicting emotional distress exists only when a “special relationship” exists; however, certain 
states have abolished these restrictive rules.  Id.  For instance, Montana and Tennessee have 
established “foreseeability” rules when determining emotional distress cases.  Id.
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law is putty.  Even the tests are putty in the hands of able judges and lawyers and savvy jurors.  
Were the plaintiff’s injuries direct?129  Remote?130  Foreseeable?131  A natural and probable result 
of the defendant’s actions?132
a.)  The One-on-One Model
Focusing narrowly under the one-on-one model may demand no recovery.  I take the 
example of the third party criminal act.133  Does a person (merchant, manufacturer, lessor) have 
an obligation to protect against a third party criminal act?  Looking at the facts of particular 
128 Id. § 377, at 1050 (“Recovery of monitoring expense, once a tort has been 
established, appears to be in accord with the usual rules of personal injury damages for 
diagnostic expenses and also with the rule that permits recovery of expenses incurred to 
minimize damages).
129Id. §§ 184-85 (noting that most courts will only impose liability for direct harms that 
are foreseeable.).  In the past, courts were willing to impose liability for unforeseeable harms, but 
Dobbs notes that “[i]t is very doubtful that liability unlimited by foreseeability has much 
contemporary support.”  Id § 185, at 458.
130Id. § 180, at 445 (Dobbs notes that the word proximate “suggests that only the most 
immediate trigger of harm can be the proximate cause.  That simply is not the law.”).
131Id. § 143, at 334 (Stating the universal principle, “An actor is negligent only if his 
conduct created an unreasonable risk of harm to others and the actor recognized, or as a 
reasonable person should have recognized that risk.”).
132See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS §§ 41-45 
(5th ed. 1984).
133See generally Dennis T. Yokoyama, The Law of Causation in Actions Involving Third-
Party Assaults When the Landowner Negligently Fails to Hire Security Guards:  A Critical 
Examination of Saelzer v. Advanced Group 400, 40 CAL. W. L. REV. 79, 80 (2003).  In Saelzer, 
a California case, a Federal Express delivery worker sued an apartment complex owner after she 
was assaulted at the apartment while making a delivery.  Id.  The California Supreme Court 
affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for the apartment complex, noting that the 
while the apartment complex had a duty to safeguard against foreseeable crime on its premises, 
the plaintiff could not prove that the presence of extra security would have prevented her being 
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cases, one might conclude that the defendant ought not to be held liable to the plaintiff.  The 
heinous actions of a particular criminal act may be so bizarre that it seems wrong to expect one 
individual to protect another individual from such inherently base, anti-social action.134  But, 
pulling back and focusing more generally, what might not be foreseeable in an individual case 
may appear downright inevitable when one focuses upon broader classes of plaintiffs.135  Thus in 
a one-on-one focused case, the decision might be no recovery and that decision might be 
correct.136  However that decision also might result in a net deterrence loss because defendants 
across the board or a defendant across a large board of plaintiffs would escape liability and 
assaulted. 
134A good example of this principle can be found in Lopez v. McDonald’s Corp., 238 
Cal. Rptr. 436 (1987).  The Lopez case focused on a 1984 incident where a man armed with 
several different types of firearms entered a McDonald’s and, without attempting to rob the store, 
killed twenty-one patrons and employees and wounded eleven others.  Id. at 438.  Survivors of 
the shooting and families of the murder victims filed suit against McDonald’s, alleging the 
restaurant failed to provide adequate security measures to prevent against dangerous and known 
risks.  Id.  The appellate court upheld the trial court’s grant of the restaurant’s motion for 
summary judgment, holding that although the restaurant was in a high-crime neighborhood, the 
restaurant was not liable for the incident:
[T]he risk of a maniacal, mass murderous assault is not a hazard the likelihood of which 
makes McDonald's conduct unreasonably dangerous. Rather, the likelihood of this 
unprecedented murderous assault was so remote and unexpected that, as a matter of law, 
the general character of McDonald's nonfeasance did not facilitate its happening. [The 
assailant’s] deranged and motiveless attack, apparently the worst mass killing by a single 
assailant in recent American history, is so unlikely to occur within the setting of modern 
life that a reasonably prudent business enterprise would not consider its occurrence in 
attempting to satisfy its general obligation to protect business invitees from reasonably 
foreseeable criminal conduct.
Id. at 445 (footnote omitted).
135See Public Tort, supra note12, at 1038-40
136Id. at 1040.
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therefore not take account of that category of accident costs in the decision making calculus.137
That failure to impose the cost reraises the subsidy theme.  Are those who escape liability 
receiving a liability “break” that results in both unequal treatment and underdeterrence?
b.)  The Class Action
Does the class action vehicle solve this deterrence loss problem?  Not if class certification 
(or recovery) is denied because courts think that causation issues are not common but individual.  
That is, if the judicial perspective on the class action is that it is a collection of traditional one-
on-one cases and that’s all, certification will be denied and individual cases will go forward.  In 
those cases the particularities of individual fact patterns probably will result in some recovery 
and some non-recovery.  Will the recoveries overall be equal to the expected injuries from some 
clearly foreseeable class of third party criminal acts resulting from particular misconduct?  The 
answer is unclear.
c.)  The Augmented Award
How about augmented awards?  Augmented awards would provide efficient deterrence 
although one plaintiff, at least, would have to successfully prosecute a tort suit.  And, of course, 
the courts would have to be attuned to the risks of overdeterrence from duplicative awards.   
d.)  The Public Tort Suit
What about the public tort?  Again the public tort seems a likely possibility for efficient 
deterrence.  But the issues of improper governmental action are, of course, still prevalent.  Now, 
137Id. at 1039
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also would be a good time to mention some other peculiarities or problems with the 
governmental tort suit.  Up to now, I have been talking about it as if the government acted as a 
collector or proxy in these cases.  What I mean is that I have discussed governmental recovery as 
if it related to the government collecting damages suffered by others.  That works—it could be 
efficient where for some reason or other those others do not sue or do not recover because of the 
particularized focus of the analysis of their claims under the one-on-one model.  However, the 
governmental entity also may seek to recover in its own right for its own damages—increased 
social welfare costs, increased medical costs, etc.138  These are costs that the governmental entity 
incurs as a result of the defendants’ actions.139  They are costs that the government itself incurs 
because of injury to individual citizens.  If the defendant involved is never liable for the costs 
that it causes to be imposed upon the state then it will never take them into account when it 
decides what to do, how to do it , and how much to charge for what it does.  Not allowing 
recovery will under deter.  It will effectively absolve the entity for some of the injury it causes.  
It will allow the entity to impose its will on the “freedom” or autonomy of others.  It will 
arguably subsidize.  That’s perfectly acceptable if that is the decision we want to make but we 
should be aware of the consequences of that decision.
138Id. at 1023, 1031.  For cases illustrating the idea, see City of Flagstaff v. Atchison, 
Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 719 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1983); Camden County Board of Chosen 
Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 245 (D.N.J. 2000); City of Philadelphia v. 
Beretta, U.S.A., 126 F. Supp. 2d 882, 894-95 (E.D. Pa. 2000). See generally, Timothy D. 
Lytton, Should Government Be Allowed to Recover the Costs of Public Services from 
Tortfeasors?: Tort Subsidies, the Limits of Loss Spreading, and the Free Public Services 
Doctrine, 76 Tulane L. Rev. 727 (2002).
139Public Tort, supra note12, at 1050-51.
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3.  Medical Monitoring
Now, let us turn to another example of a type of case where individual claims might not 
achieve efficient deterrence.  Should a defendant or defendants be liable to a plaintiff or a class 
of plaintiffs for the costs of medical monitoring?140  In some ways the claim is radical when 
viewed through the lens of the one-on-one suit.  In the traditional tort suit injury has occurred 
and the plaintiff is seeking to recover for that injury.  But even in that traditional suit we allow 
the plaintiff to recover for the future anticipated effects of the injury suffered.141  And, at least in 
certain types of cases we have allowed plaintiffs to obtain injunctions against threatened future 
wrong.  Couple that fact with the reality that medical monitoring is a type of mitigation 
behavior—striving for early detection to minimize the future consequences of the defendant’s 
behavior and the medical monitoring claim makes imminent sense.142  It is a mandatory 
injunction in the context of allowing the plaintiff to recover for mitigation related behavior.
But should the award be made in a lump sum to an individual plaintiff?  While there is 
nothing to suggest that such an award would be improper in itself, such an award to a class of un-
or underinsured people exposed to some substance that could lead to a future illness that can be 
more effectively treated if detected early becomes particularly compelling.  Augmented awards 
arguably have less applicability here.  The idea is not to pay someone off here to encourage 
efficient deterrence.  The idea is to try and encourage monitoring that could efficiently minimize 
140For a related explanation and discussion of medical monitoring, see Disaggregating, 
supra note 34, at 124-25.
141Id.
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total damages.  Perhaps the most compelling case of all for medical monitoring would be a 
public tort suit where the plaintiff sued for expenditures the governmental entity had made to 
monitor citizens for the feared adverse health consequence.  Ironically, recovery should not 
logically be limited to a governmental entity.  An insurer would seem to be in just as good a 
position to recover.  But most courts that have dealt with the issue have held that insurers cannot 
recover from tobacco companies for health related costs attributed to tobacco.
IV.  Conclusions
In conclusion, class actions, augmented awards, and public tort suits may provide 
deterrence gains in certain types of cases where the one-on-one model results in underdeterrence.  
These devices or models may force defendants to take account of costs that their activities pose 
but that would not be recovered under the traditional one-on-one tort model.  This failure of the 
traditional model might be because everyone injured does not sue.  Or, it might be because 
traditional tort law focuses too narrowly on the parties before the court thereby resulting in 
underdeterrence.  A broader focus provided by one of the other models might result in efficient 
deterrence.  Ironically, if a class action is viewed as a collection of individual claims subject to 
all the same substantive rules as the one-on-one case, then the class action’s promise for efficient 
deterrence may be limited in comparison to the augmented award or the public tort suit.
Critically, tort law is a legal place where key determinations about freedom are made.  In 
torts cases, courts decide where my freedom ends and where your freedom begins.  In a capitalist 
142DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES.
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society, allowing someone to act without having to take full account of the costs of his or her 
activities is to give excessive protection to that person’s freedom.  In the accident arena, that 
excessive freedom is obtained at the expense of injured citizens and at the expense of 
competitors who face full costs.  As a result, one might conclude that values of efficiency, 
freedom and equality are frustrated when a society tolerates underdeterrence.  In that regard, as 
the nation focuses on the possibility of overdeterrence and the need for tort “reform,” we should 
not ignore the very real possibility or impact of underdeterrence.  The depth of any meaningful 
reform depends upon providing the ultimate decision makers with the contrasting perspectives 
from which that depth may appear.  Any possible syncretic solution requires a vibrant political 
and intellectual consideration of the whole and not just one side’s views.
